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IE Defender Removal Tool FixIEDef, Now Has It’s Own Web Page.

Monday, November 12th, 2007

FixIEDef can now be found on it’s very own web page at the MalwareTeks main site: http://www.malwareteks.com/FixIEDef.php

This is the official web page for FixIEDef, and this page may not be mirrored.

Can You Spot What Is Not Quite Right?

Monday, June 30th, 2008

Screenshot from my visit to the IE Antivirus Free Scanner Web Page:

Screenshot - IE AntiVirus - Free VirusScanner.png

Can you spot what’s not right with this picture?  The answer is found in the red-boxed text.

Somehow they managed to identify my Operating System as Windows, when my Browser information says I’m on Linux.

Now keep in mind that your Operating System is part of the information transmitted by your web browser when connecting to a web site.

Things that make you go H’m!

Stay tuned more to follow of this particular scam.

Interesting developments with Enigma Software

Wednesday, May 21st, 2008

There has been some interesting developments with Enigma Software Group, Inc of late. First a corporate name change to City Loan, Inc; and now new developments on their web site.

Is this a simple case of hacking?

Coverage at the Certifiedbug.com Blog:
Enigma software, have they been hacked, or…
Enigma of enigma software

Coverage at Vitalsecurity.org:
Scan your entire computer to detect…..wait, what…

Enigma has a somewhat controversial past:
Enigma Software, A Mystery?
Enigma Software Group did it again?
Anti-Spyware 101: Another Site Pushing SpyHunter
SpyHunter, should this be listed as a Rogue Anti-Spyware Application?
411-spyware.com - The new forum spammers?
Spyware Help: Intent Matters Alot:Part 2
I’m on it, Get on it, The troops are on fire

EDIT: Added link to write up by PaperGhost over at Vitalsecurity.org

Tech Groups Back Kaspersky in Fight Against Zango - Security

Tuesday, May 6th, 2008

In May 2007, Bellvue, Wash.-based Zango, a company that makes software to serve pop-up ads and tracks users’ activities on behalf of online marketers, sued Kaspersky, charging that the company interfered with its business by removing its “adware” without first alerting the user. Kaspersky is hardly alone in classifying Zango’s software as

read more | digg story

Security Myths

Tuesday, April 29th, 2008

think you can tell if you have a virus without av? think you’re smart enough to avoid viruses? you might need to think again

read more | digg story

Windows XP Service Pack 3 Released to Manufacturing

Monday, April 21st, 2008

Posted today by Chris Keroack [MSFT] at 21 Apr 2008 5:04 PM UTC on TechNet Forums

Today we are happy to announce that Windows XP Service Pack 3 (SP3) has released to manufacturing (RTM). Windows XP SP3 bits are now working their way through our manufacturing channels to be available to OEM and Enterprise customers.

We are also in the final stages of preparing for release to the web (i.e. you!) on April 29th, via Windows Update and the Microsoft Download Center. Online documentation for Windows XP SP3, such as Microsoft Knowledge Base articles and the Microsoft TechNet Windows XP TechCenter, will be updated then. For customers who use Windows XP at home, Windows XP SP3 Automatic Update distribution for users at home will begin in early summer.

Thanks to everyone here who installed the public betas – you not only gave us detailed feedback but also helped each other out with timely troubleshooting. Through the beta program we found several important issues and were able to confirm some essential fixes. We couldn’t have done this without you.

We will still be monitoring this forum during the next few weeks in case you have more feedback about the release of Windows XP SP3.

On behalf of myself, Shashank Bansal and Windows Serviceability, many thanks.

Chris Keroack
Release Manager, Windows XP Service Pack 3
Windows Serviceability

Microsoft Security Advisory (951306)

Friday, April 18th, 2008

Microsoft Security Advisory (951306)

Vulnerability in Windows Could Allow Elevation of Privilege

Published: April 17, 2008

Microsoft is investigating new public reports of a vulnerability which could allow elevation of privilege from authenticated user to LocalSystem, affecting Windows XP Professional Service Pack 2 and all supported versions and editions of Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, and Windows Server 2008. Customers who allow user-provided code to run in an authenticated context, such as within Internet Information Services (IIS) and SQL Server, should review this advisory. Hosting providers may be at increased risk from this elevation of privilege vulnerability.

Currently, Microsoft is not aware of any attacks attempting to exploit the potential vulnerability. Upon completion of this investigation, Microsoft will take the appropriate action to protect our customers, which may include providing a solution through a service pack, our monthly security update release process, or an out-of-cycle security update, depending on customer needs.

General Information

Overview

Purpose of Advisory: To provide customers with the initial notification and provide additional information regarding the impact to Windows service accounts. For more information, see the Workarounds and Suggested Actions sections of the security advisory.

Advisory Status: Advisory published.

Recommendation: Review the suggested actions and configure as appropriate.

References Identification

Microsoft Knowledge Base Article

951306

CVE Reference

CVE-2008-1436

This advisory discusses the following software.

Related Software

Windows XP Professional Service Pack 2

Windows Server 2003 Service Pack 1 and Windows Server 2003 Service Pack 2

Windows Server 2003 x64 Edition and Windows Server 2003 x64 Edition Service Pack 2

Windows Server 2003 with SP1 for Itanium-based Systems and Windows Server 2003 with SP2 for Itanium based Systems

Windows Vista and Windows Vista Service Pack 1

Windows Vista x64 Edition and Windows Vista x64 Edition Service Pack 1

Windows Server 2008 for 32-bit Systems

Windows Server 2008 for x64-based Systems

Windows Server 2008 for Itanium-based Systems

Frequently Asked Questions

What is the scope of the advisory?
This advisory clarifies public reports of a potential vulnerability which could allow elevation of privilege from authenticated user to LocalSystem, affecting Windows XP Professional Service Pack 2, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, and Windows Server 2008. The issue affects the software listed in the “Overview” section.

Is this a security vulnerability that requires Microsoft to issue a security update?
Upon completion of this investigation, Microsoft will take the appropriate action to help protect our customers. This may include providing a security update through our security update release process.

What causes this threat?
Specially crafted code running in the context of the NetworkService or LocalService accounts may gain access to resources in processes that are also running as NetworkService or LocalService. Some of these processes may have the ability to elevate their privileges to LocalSystem, allowing any NetworkService or LocalService processes to elevate their privileges to LocalSystem as well.

How is IIS affected?
User-provided code running in IIS, for example ISAPI filters and extensions, and ASP.NET code running in full trust may be affected by this vulnerability. IIS is not affected in the following scenarios:

Default Installations of IIS 5.1, IIS 6.0, and IIS 7.0
ASP.NET configured to run with a trust level lower than Full Trust.
Classic ASP code

How is SQL Server affected?
SQL Server is affected if a user is granted administrative privileges to load and run code. A user with administrative privileges could execute specially crafted code that could leverage the attack. However, this privilege is not granted by default.

Are there other vectors that an attacker could leverage?
Yes. On Windows Server 2003, an attacker can leverage the Microsoft Distributed Transaction Coordinator (MSDTC) service that runs as NetworkService to acquire a NetworkService token into a process that is running as an identity other than a service identity. An attacker can then use this NetworkService token to elevate to System if this process identity possesses the SeImpersonatePrivilege. This vector does not exist on Windows Server 2008 or Windows Vista.

What additional applications may be affected?
Any process with SeImpersonatePrivilege, as described in Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 821546, which loads and runs user-provided code may be susceptible to an elevation of privilege attack as described in this advisory.

What systems are primarily at risk from the vulnerability?
Windows XP Professional Service Pack 2 and all supported versions and editions of Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, and Windows Server 2008 may be at risk if IIS is enabled or SQL Server is installed and configured or deployed in a vulnerable state as described by this advisory. IIS systems that allow users to upload code are at increased risk. SQL Server systems are at risk if untrusted users are granted privileged account access. This may include Web hosting providers or similar environments.

Suggested Actions

Workarounds

IIS 6.0 - Configure a Worker Process Identity (WPI) for an application pool in IIS to use a created account in IIS Manager and disable MSDTC

Perform the following steps:

1. In IIS Manager, expand the local computer, expand Application Pools, right-click the application pool and select Properties.
2. Click the Identity tab and click Configurable. In the User name and Password boxes, type the user name and password of the account under which you want the worker process to operate.
3. Add the chosen user account to the IIS_WPG group.

Disabling the Distributed Transaction Coordinator will help protect the affected system from attempts to exploit this vulnerability. To disable the Distributed Transaction Coordinator, perform these steps:

1. Click Start, and then click Control Panel. Alternatively, point to Settings, and then click Control Panel.
2. Double-click Administrative Tools. Alternatively, click Switch to Classic View and then double-click Administrative Tools.
3. Double-click Services.
4. Double-click Distributed Transaction Coordinator.
5. In the Startup type list, click Disabled.
6. Click Stop (if started), and then click OK.

You can also stop and disable the MSDTC service by using the following command at the command prompt:

sc stop MSDTC & sc config MSDTC start= disabled

Impact of Workaround: Managing the additional user accounts created in this workaround results in increased administrative overhead. Depending on the nature of applications running in this application pool, application functionality may be affected. Disabling MSDTC will prevent applications from using distributed transactions. Disabling MSDTC will prevent IIS 5.1 from running in Windows XP Professional Service Pack 2 and IIS 6.0 running in IIS 5.0 compatibility mode. Disabling MSDTC will prevent configuration as well as running of COM+ applications.

IIS 7.0 - Specify a WPI for an application pool in IIS Manager

1. In IIS Manager, expand the server node, click Application Pools, right-click the application pool, and then click Advanced Settings…
2. .Find the Identity entry, and click the button to open the Application Pool Identity dialog box.
3. Select the Custom account option and click Set to open the Set Credentials dialog box. Type in the selected Account name and Password in the user name and password text boxes. Retype the Password in the Confirm password text box, then click OK.

Note Application pool identities are dynamically added to IIS_WPG group in IIS7 and don’t need to be manually added.

Impact of Workaround: Managing the additional user accounts created in this workaround results in increased administrative overhead. Depending on the nature of applications running in this application pool, application functionality may be affected.

IIS 7.0 - Specify a WPI for an application pool using the Command Line utility APPCMD.exe

1. From a command prompt, change to the %systemroot%\system32\inetsrv directory.
2. Execute the APPCMD.exe command using the following syntax: string is the name of the application pool; Username string is the user name of the account assigned to the application pool; Password string is the password for the account.

appcmd set config /section:applicationPools /
[name='string'].processModel.identityType:SpecificUser  /
[name='string'].processModel.userName:string /
[name='string'].processModel.password:string

Note Application pool identities are dynamically added to IIS_WPG group in IIS 7.0 and don’t need to be manually added.

Impact of Workaround: Managing the additional user accounts created in this workaround results in increased administrative overhead. Depending on the nature of applications running in this application pool, application functionality may be affected.

Resources:

You can provide feedback by completing the form by visiting Microsoft Help and Support: Contact Us.
Customers in the United States and Canada can receive technical support from Microsoft Product Support Services. For more information about available support options, see Microsoft Help and Support.
International customers can receive support from their local Microsoft subsidiaries. For more information about how to contact Microsoft for international support issues, visit International Support.
Microsoft TechNet Security provides additional information about security in Microsoft products.

Disclaimer:

The information provided in this advisory is provided “as is” without warranty of any kind. Microsoft disclaims all warranties, either express or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall Microsoft Corporation or its suppliers be liable for any damages whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential, loss of business profits or special damages, even if Microsoft Corporation or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability for consequential or incidental damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply.

Revisions:

April 17, 2008: Advisory published

SecurityFocus SQL Injection Bogus

Monday, April 14th, 2008

Originally posted at Photo Matt

Since people are asking, this so-called alert on Security Focus appears to be completely false and has no information that an attacker or the WordPress developers could use. It is completely content-free, except for making claims that every version of WP since 2.0 is vulnerable.

Online, apparently, it’s fine for someone to run into a crowded theatre and yell “fire” and the less basis there is in fact the more people link to them. It’s not uncommon to see crying-wolf reports like the above several times in a week, and a big part of what the WP security team is sifting through things to see what’s valid or not.  [More ...]

Mozilla Firefox Multiple Vulnerabilities

Thursday, March 27th, 2008

Secunia Advisory: SA29526
Release Date: 2008-03-26
Critical: Highly critical

Description:
Some vulnerabilities and weaknesses have been reported in Mozilla Firefox, which can be exploited by malicious people to bypass certain security restrictions, disclose potentially sensitive information, conduct cross-site scripting and phishing attacks, and potentially compromise a user’s system.

1. An unspecified error in the handling of “XPCNativeWrappers” can lead to the execution of arbitrary Javascript code with the user’s privileges via “setTimeout()” calls.

2. Various errors in the handling of Javascript code can be exploited to conduct cross-site scripting attacks or execute arbitrary code.

3. Various errors in the layout engine can be exploited to cause a memory corruption.

4. Various errors in the Javascript engine can be exploited to cause a memory corruption.

Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities may allow execution of arbitrary code.

5. An error within the handling of HTTP “Referer:” headers sent with requests to URLs containing “Basic Authentication” credentials having an empty username can be exploited to bypass cross-site request forgery protections.

6. The problem is that Firefox offers a previously configured private SSL certificate when establishing connections to webservers requesting SSL Client Authentication. This can potentially be exploited to disclose sensitive information via a malicious webserver.

7. An error in the handling of the “jar:” protocol can be exploited to establish connections to arbitrary ports on the local machine.

8. An error when displaying XUL pop-up windows can be exploited to hide the window’s borders and facilitate phishing attacks.

The vulnerabilities are reported in versions prior to 2.0.0.13.

Solution:
Update to version 2.0.0.13.

Provided and/or discovered by:
1. moz_bug_r_a4
2. moz_bug_r_a4, Boris Zbarsky, and Johnny Stenback
3. Tom Ferris, Seth Spitzer, Martin Wargers, John Daggett, and Mats Palmgren
4. georgi, tgirmann, and Igor Bukanov
5, 7. Gregory Fleischer
6. Peter Brodersen and Alexander Klink
8. Chris Thomas

Original Advisory:
http://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/2008/mfsa2008-14.html
http://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/2008/mfsa2008-15.html
http://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/2008/mfsa2008-16.html
http://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/2008/mfsa2008-17.html
http://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/2008/mfsa2008-18.html
http://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/2008/mfsa2008-19.html

Other References:
SA27311: http://secunia.com/advisories/27311/

The Sheer Lunacy of Suggesting the Use of a Blank Password

Saturday, March 8th, 2008

I’ve come the conclusion, that the writer’s for main stream technical publications; are just as over-the-top, as any other journalist.

Very recently, some one discovered the Microsoft article, Strong passwords: How to create and use them, published 22 March, 2006. It’s 2 years old. The article as you can imagine is about creating strong passwords. About two-thirds down the page, you encounter this: The “blank password” option.

The author of the article goes on to say at this point, “A blank password (no password at all) on your account is more secure than a weak password such as “1234″.” Whoa, wait-a-minute, what the… Then he/she clarifies that statement, be explaining what he/she means.

What’s so special about a blank password? On a computer with Windows XP or newer installed, an account without a password cannot be accessed remotely by means such as a network or the Internet.

If the default settings have not been altered by the system user.

Under very specific conditions, and somewhat rare, the use of a blank password is just fine.

  • You only have one computer or you have several computers but you do not need to access information on one computer from another one
  • The computer is physically secure (you trust everyone who has physical access to the computer)

The second bullet is the most difficult condition to meet.

So, this passage of the MS article has been translated into “Blank Passwords Are More Secure” by the technical media. Have you lost your minds? Get real! The average non-technical reader is going to take that as gospel, and switch to using no password at all. Which, I have no doubt that many are doing so or using something like “password1″ or “1234″.

Now here comes my thoughts of the subject:

The sheer lunacy of even suggesting using a blank password for local log-on. That’s the first thing a hacker will try, when sitting in front of a terminal.

Forcing local log-in using a strong password is meant to prevent unauthorized access to the local system; and if the system is configured properly, you’ll be locked out after x number of failed attempts. Which, means reboot and start over. Brute force attacks aren’t effective when the system in configured correctly; and a hacker won’t spend that much time trying to get into the system.

If the system is connected to a network, then Network log-on should be required, and if that is configured properly; not only are you locked out of the system after x number of failed attempts, you are locked out of the network. Until the Network Administrator resets your account and issues you a new password.

There’s been a lot of articles talking about password strength, password security, password cracking of late. None of them, absolutely none of them, with the exception of the MS article, talk about the use of pass phrases of 15 character or greater in length. Why a pass phrase 15 characters or longer? They can not be broken by existing methods. They can be captured by keyloggers.

If your password is 15 characters or longer, Windows stores the constant AAD3B435B51404EEAAD3B435B51404EE as your LM hash, which is equivalent to a null password. And since your password is obviously not null, attempts to crack that hash will fail.

These articles also fail to point out that the hacker must have access, either remotely or locally, to crack a password. If they have access to the system, then they don’t need to crack the password. There are far more reliable (quicker) methods of compromising a system, Social Engineering attacks leading the way.

The rest of the Microsoft article, Strong passwords: How to create and use them, gives very sound advice on creating strong passwords. You should read it, following the advice given on that page will go a long ways to making your online experience a safer one.

Creating strong passwords and keeping them private, is just one piece of the security puzzle; a very critical piece, but still just one piece.


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